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## RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

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THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Aberdeen. By JOSIAH ROYCE. First Series: *The Four Historical Conceptions of Being*. New York: Macmillan, 1899. Pp. xvi + 588. \$3, net.

THIS volume bears as subtitle "The Four Historical Conceptions of Being." These, as here stated, are realism, mysticism, critical rationalism, and idealism as held by Professor Royce—"that concrete conception of being which to my mind constitutes idealism." The author, speaking of this arrangement, says: "I believe this aspect of these lectures to be in many respects a novelty in discussion." Well, we have no objection to it on the ground of novelty, but, taken on its merits, from a real philosophical point of view it seems somewhat superficial and arbitrary. For instance, take the case of Plato; while he is usually regarded as the first great idealist, Professor Royce classes him as a realist, but "history shows that the rigid world of Platonic ideas, when viewed by later speculation, began ere long to glow like sunset clouds, with the light of the divine presence, and Neoplatonism already called the ideas the thoughts of God" (p. 262). And again: "Plato's conception of being, while technically realistic, contains tendencies that inevitably lead to the differentiation of other ontological conceptions, and so our present third conception of being is in part due to Plato" (p. 228). We do not in the meantime discuss these statements or ask whether the world of Plato's ideas was as "rigid" as the term "realist" implies, but we hold that such divisions must not be pressed too far. In fact, it is difficult to fix any of the great representative thinkers into the conventional compartments which such a classification creates. Take the case of Spinoza. Surely he was in a very real sense a rationalist; here we meet him first among the realists, and later he appears in the glorious company of mystics. Kant is a realist in virtue of "the things in themselves" (p. 63), but he is a critical rationalist in virtue of other elements in his system (p. 233). Perhaps this does not show that the classification is useless, but it certainly proves that it is abstract and needs careful handling. Professor Royce handles it effectively for his own purpose, which is to show that the first three conceptions are unsatisfactory, and that whatever

element of truth there is in them is gathered up into his own higher theory. Severe critics might contend that much of the effect is rhetorical rather than logical. Each of the three systems receives sentence and dismissal. (1) "The realistic definition of being, simply and rigidly applied, destroys its own entire realm, denies its own pre-suppositions, and shows us as its one unquestionable domain the meaningless wilderness of absolute nothingness." (2) Mysticism is sympathetically treated; it has more affinity with Professor Royce's own views, and the average reader will probably find the chapter on "The Unity of Being" the most interesting and stimulating. It illustrates very fully the statement that "mysticism as a mere doctrine of edification is indeed not philosophy. Yet a philosophy has been based upon it." This, however, is the conclusion reached: "If mysticism is to escape from its own finitude and really is to mean by its absolute being anything but a mere nothing, its account of being must be so amended as to involve the assertion that our ideas are not merely false, and that we are already, even as finite, in touch with reality." (3) Critical rationalism is condemned because "in defining possibilities of experience it tells you only mere abstract universals. But a mere universal is so far a bare *what*. One wants to make more explicit the *that*, to find something individual." After all this we are told that "for us the road must still prove long." We cannot follow all the windings of the path or do more than ask the question: Does Professor Royce's form of idealism bring us to the end of the road or within sight of the end? We know that many students of philosophy will be dissatisfied with the treatment that Kant receives in this volume from one whose business it is to deal with the history of philosophy. The chief task of criticism, however, when it examines our author's discussion of "The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas," will be to decide whether, besides emphasizing in many poetic and suggestive passages the concreteness of experience and the elements of will and aspiration in mental life, he has really solved his problem. It is true, as he insists, that our knowledge is never perfect and our ideals never completely realized, but are we therefore doomed to seek for reality in a "beyond"? Does not the rational principle involved in present experience link us to reality? Sometimes he seems to assert this in highly rhetorical style (p. 356), but on the whole he appears to base his demonstration of the Absolute on the limitations and incompleteness of human experience (pp. 297, 298, etc.), and many will find it hard to reach the Absolute through Mr. Royce's "finite ideas."

However, we have said sufficient to show that this is a vigorous contribution to philosophical discussion which raises in a fresh form many old problems, and demands, as it will no doubt receive, fair criticism from those whose special vocation it is to deal with such questions. If there is a growing interest in these questions, it is a healthy sign. It is not given to many to make a permanent contribution in the highest realms of thought, but the man who quickens our thinking powers and gives us a wider outlook renders real service; for the value of such discussions is not to be measured by information imparted or formal solutions attained, but by the increase of energy and hopefulness in men who feel that there is no escape from these great problems. "For in the victorious warfare with finitude consists the perfection of the spirit" (p. 382).

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ALLGEMEINE GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE MIT BESONDERER  
BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER RELIGIONEN. VON PAUL DEUSSEN.  
Erster Band, erste Abteilung: Allgemeine Einleitung und  
Philosophie des Veda bis auf die Upanishads; zweite Abtei-  
lung: Die Philosophie der Upanishads. Leipzig: Brock-  
haus, 1894, 1899. Pp. xvi + 336; xii + 368. M. 16.

THE introduction to Professor Deussen's work indicates how generously he proposes to interpret the word "allgemeine." Most historians of philosophy slip very rapidly over the oriental field in order seriously to begin their exposition with the Greek thinkers. Not so Deussen. He divides his subject into five main sections: Indian philosophy, Greek philosophy, philosophy of the Bible, mediæval philosophy, modern philosophy. In connection with the first part he proposes to discuss Chinese philosophy. Under the third come the religion and philosophy of Egypt and the Iranian *Weltanschauung*, along with Mosaism, Judaism, and Christianity. How fully these usually neglected sections are likely to be treated is illustrated by these two parts of the first volume filling more than 600 pages, in which but two out of three divisions of Indian philosophy alone are expounded. It is true that the author is primarily an Indianist, which fact may lead him to dwell more fully on the Indian ideas. Moreover, there can be no doubt on the part of any reader that he is profoundly impressed with their unusual value in the philosophical realm.